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In recent years, a large academic debate has tried to explain the rapid rise in CEO pay 
experienced over the past three decades. In this article, I review the main proposed theories, 
which span views of compensation as the result of a competitive labor market for executives 
to theories based on excess of managerial power. Some of these hypotheses have found 
support in cross-sectional evidence, but it has proven more difficult to determine which 
factors have caused the observed changes in pay over time. An alternative strategy is to 
evaluate the fit of plausible explanations out of sample by contrasting them with the evolution 
in executive pay and the market for managers during earlier time periods. A case study of 
General Electric suggests that evidence for earlier decades can speak to the recent trends and 
reveals the limitations of current explanations to address the long-run data. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As the main decision makers in large public corporations, top executives comprise an 
important albeit small part of the labor force.  Thus, the compensation of these 
individuals is of special interest because it influences their decision-making process.   
Since the 1980s, the academic research on executive pay has grown significantly 
(Murphy 1999).  This new interest on the topic is probably related to two main reasons.  
First, the level of executive compensation has soared since the 1970s, due in part to the 
increasing use of employee stock options (Murphy 1999, Hall and Liebman 1998).  In 
consequence, both the high levels of pay and the structure of compensation have become 
under intense scrutiny.  Second, comprehensive datasets with detailed information on the 
compensation of top managers are available for this period, allowing a precise 
determination of the stylized facts on pay over the past three decades.  
The recent trends in executive pay have generated a considerable debate on the 
determinants of compensation.  Proposed theories cover a wide spectrum, ranging from 
viewing the level of pay as the efficient outcome from a competitive labor market for 
managers to arguing that extremely high pay is the result of managers inefficiently 
extracting rents from the firms they manage.  While some of the proposed hypotheses 
have found support in cross-sectional evidence, it has proven more difficult to tease out 
the drivers of pay over time.  Since the 1970s, the level of executive pay has exhibited a 
steady upward trend.  The potential determinants of pay suggested by most of these 
theories have also changed mostly monotonically during this period, leading to a   2
systematic correlation between these variables and executive pay.  Thus, it is difficult to 
disentangle which of the proposed explanations has mattered in a more causal manner 
focusing only on evidence for recent years.   
An alternative strategy consists in verifying the predictions of various theories by 
using data for other countries or other time periods.  A substantial literature has 
established how compensation practices vary across countries and is now starting to 
evaluate different theories on pay using these data.
1   Information on managerial pay from 
other periods in U.S. history is also a valuable addition because other periods provide 
more variation in the trends in pay and in the determinants to be assessed with arguably 
less variation in institutions than in cross-country studies.  Frydman and Saks (2008) 
provide such a study by setting forth the long-run changes in compensation in a 
systematic manner and quantitatively analyzing the contribution of several explanations 
to the trends in pay over time.  In this article, I build on that work by focusing on the 
evolution of compensation and managerial backgrounds of the top executives of General 
Electric.   This qualitative case study addresses a larger set of theories for the recent 
changes in pay and provides a more involved view on the uses of historical data than was 
possible in Frydman and Saks (2008).  
The lead explanations for the recent rise on executive pay can be broadly divided 
into two categories.  First, a set of theories view compensation as the competitive 
outcome from the labor and product markets.  These explanations encompass the role of 
demand for talent and scale effects; increase in the demand for generalist CEOs; the 
effects of trade and product market competition; and the emergence of alternative outside 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Llense (2008) for an application of the Gabaix and Landier (2008) model to French 
data.   3
options for managers.  A second set of theories emphasizes the constraints that 
institutions, either within or outside corporations, impose on executive pay.  The main 
hypotheses in this group include managers’ ability to extract rents from firms with weak 
corporate governance; the monitoring performed by large shareholders; the effects of 
peer benchmarking; and the role of social norms.  I summarize these explanations, 
making an emphasis on the limitations that each one has in accounting for the changes in 
compensation over time using only data for the last three decades. 
While earlier data provide an alternative “laboratory” to analyze the different 
theories on executive compensation, a potential concern is that the organization of firms 
has evolved significantly over time.  However, the experience of public corporations 
during earlier decades is relevant for the policies implemented in recent years.  The role 
of top managers has not changed significantly since the separation of corporate 
ownership from corporate control at the turn of the twentieth century (Berle and Means 
1991, Chandler 1977).  Thus, the main issues concerned with the remuneration of 
corporate executives have been prevalent over the longer run.  
To provide an involved view of the changes and challenges experienced by firms 
over the longer run, I review the experience of General Electric.  The history of this 
successful corporation serves to illustrate a significant evolution in the compensation and 
the labor market for top managers over time.  Relative to the evidence for the past three 
decades, the level of pay of GE’s executives was significantly lower and grew at a slower 
rate from the 1940s to the 1970s.
2  The characteristics of GE’s managers have also 
changed, from the executives having education mostly in engineering or law earlier in the 
                                                 
2 This pattern in the evolution of compensation for GE’s top managers is similar to the trend in pay of the 
larger sample of firms analyzed in Frydman and Saks (2008).   4
century to a more diverse educational background since the 1960s.  Moreover, recent 
managers have worked in different sectors of the firm, potentially acquiring skills that are 
more general in nature.  The acquisition of general human capital may have allowed 
internal candidates for the CEO position to leave the firm for corporations in different 
industries when passed up for the chief executive job.   
Since the trends for GE are not unique to this corporation, the historical evidence 
suggests that assessing the mechanisms that determine executive pay is still an important 
challenge.  Most of the proposed theories for the recent decades do not seem to fit well 
with the data on compensation and the characteristics of managers prior to the 1970s.  
Thus, future work on executive compensation can learn from the past to further our 
understanding of the present.    
 
2.  The current debate on the determinants of the growth in executive pay  
Many different theories have been proposed to explain the recent rise in CEO pay.  While 
difficult to categorize them, these explanations can broadly be divided as theories that 
view the level of executive pay as a result of competitive forces in the labor and product 
markets and theories that argue that institutions either within or outside the firm influence 
the level of pay.  I summarize the most popular explanations within these two groups and 
assess their limitations for explaining the evolution of executive compensation over time.   
  
2.1.  Competition and executive compensation 
2.1.a Demand for talent and scale effects   5
In recent years, the view that executive pay is the response to supply and demand forces 
within a competitive labor market for executives has gathered increasing support.   
Models such as Rosen (1981 and 1982) propose that competition for scarce managerial 
talent leads to relative higher level of pay in larger firms in a given year.  The marginal 
product of CEO’s effort is higher in larger firms because the ability of the chief executive 
trickles down more hierarchical layers.  Consequently, competition leads to positive 
assortative matching between managerial ability and firm size.  
More recently, this idea has been adapted to explain the growth in compensation 
over time (Tervio 2008).  Within this framework, Gabaix and Landier (2008) argue that 
changes in the level compensation over time should be determined by the growth in the 
size of the typical firm in the economy.  Indeed, they find a one-to-one correlation 
between CEO pay and the market capitalization of the median firm among the largest 500 
since the 1970s.  According to their view, an increase in the scale of firms completely 
explains the growth in CEO pay over time.   
The assessment of this theory presents two main empirical challenges.  First, a 
correlation between the level of CEO compensation and median firm size does not imply 
a causal relationship between these two measures.  Moreover, the documented empirical 
relationship does not establish that the underlying mechanism generating this correlation 
is actually caused by the assignment of scarce managerial talent to firms in a competitive 
market. 
  
2.1.b Changes in the types of managerial skills   6
A related view that also relies on a competitive labor market for executives argues that 
the increase in compensation is related to a shift in the type of skills that firms demand, 
from firm-specific human capital to general managerial skills (Murphy and Zábojník 
2004).  This theory predicts that, as general skills become relatively more important, 
average pay increases, more CEOs are hired from outside the firm, and the disparity 
between CEO pay and other top executives at the corporation increases (Murphy and 
Zábojník 2004, Frydman 2006).   
  An advantage of this explanation is that it matches well with the rising mobility of 
executives experienced in recent decades.  While only 15 percent of new CEO 
appointments were hired from outside the firm in the 1970s, almost 33 percent of the 
chief executives selected from 2000 to 2005 were outsiders (Murphy and Zábojník 2007).  
However, a main challenge for this theory is to quantify managerial skills.  Moreover, 
changes in the demand for skills, which is most likely related to the production function 
of firms, probably occurred slowly over time.   
 
2.1.c Trade and product market competition 
Because labor markets receive a negative signal on managerial quality when firm 
performance suffers, competition in the product market may serve as an alternative 
mechanism to explicit wage contracts in the disciplining of managers (Fama 1980).   
However, recent research argues instead that higher-powered incentives are needed when 
product markets are more competitive.  In periods of globalization, technological 
innovation, and deregulation, the complexity of the responsibilities of top management 
increases, thereby increasing the demand for talented executives.  Thus, higher   7
performance pay is required to attract and provide incentives to top managers.  Because a 
higher level of pay is needed to compensate risk-averse executives for the extra risk 
added by incentives, the recent growth in pay may be the result of more product market 
competition. 
  An advantage of this explanation is that allows for a cleaner identification strategy 
than most other theories on executive pay.  For example, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2006) 
find that the sensitivity of pay to firm performance, the inequality among top managers 
within the firm, and the probability of turnover increase when competition (measured by 
import penetration) becomes more pronounced.  Moreover, pay-performance sensitivities 
also increase when industries deregulate (Hubbard and Palia 1995, Cuñat and Guadalupe 
2004).  Although exogenous shocks to competition provide a valuable identification 
strategy, this methodology is more useful for identifying effects of competition on pay-
to-performance than on the level of pay.  Moreover, a trade-off of using a precise strategy 
is that it allows for identifying only very particular aspects of competition.  Thus, a large 
fraction of the variation in pay over time remains unexplained within this framework. 
 
2.1.d The rise of finance and outside options for corporate managers 
In most models proposing a competitive labor market for executive, the level of pay is 
positively associated with the outside option of top managers.  Thus, the recent rise in 
executive pay could be related to an increase in the reward that CEOs can obtain in 
alternative activities.  In recent decades, the opportunities and the gains in the financial 
sector have developed dramatically (Kaplan and Rauh 2007).  Thus, the increase in CEO   8
pay may be an equilibrium effect if highly paid jobs in finance are a plausible alternative 
for top managers.  
For this argument to hold, close substitution between the skills to become a 
successful leader in large public companies and in the financial sector is a key 
assumption.  However, little is known about the relevant labor market for CEOs and other 
top executives.  The supply of executives and the alternative jobs that these individuals 
could engage is largely unknown, making it extremely difficult to quantitatively assess 
this hypothesis.  
 
2.2 Institutional factors inside and outside the firm 
2.2.a Corporate governance and extraction of rents 
A large literature has suggested that the high level in executive compensation is the result 
of CEOs ability to extract rents from the firm (Bebchuk and Fried 2003 and 2004).  When 
firms’ boards of directors are not strong to limit the power of CEOs, chief executives 
acting in a self-interested manner will skim the firm.  According to this view, the level of 
executive pay is excessive and inefficient.  Moreover, proponents of this view argue that 
the structure of pay is also the result of poor corporate governance, as entrenched 
executives find it easier to reward themselves with lavish paychecks in forms of 
compensation that are less observable or harder to value, as employee stock options, 
pensions, perquisites and severance payments. 
  Given some highly publicized cases of managerial power leading to outrageous 
compensation packages, this hypothesis has some merit.  Moreover, differences in 
corporate governance seem to influence the specific behavior of executive pay.  For   9
example, CEOs in firms with weak boards are rewarded for lucky events that increase 
firm value but that are independent of their actions.  However, chief executives also 
receive hefty paychecks in firms with strong governance with the intent to provide 
incentives (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).  Thus, managerial skimming may be the 
correct explanation for the level of compensation in a few firms, but it is less obvious 
whether this theory can account for the changes in the median level of pay.   
While rent extraction may help explain some of the variation in pay in the cross-
section, it is more unlikely that the trend in pay over time is due to governance practices.  
A steady worsening in the corporate governance of U.S. corporations may help explain 
the explosion in pay and in stock option use since the 1980s, but most available proxies 
for governance show no deterioration over this period.
3  Moreover, even a correlation 
between governance measures and the level or structure of pay does not imply that the 
relationship between these variables is causal.  Since the governance structure is an 
endogenous choice of corporations, identifying causality is particularly difficult in this 
context.  
  
2.2.b Direct monitoring of large shareholders 
Although high levels of pay are usually linked to poor corporate governance, an 
alternative view claims that this trend could actually be associated with improvements in 
governance.  As corporate governance improves, boards become more diligent and 
independent.  As a consequence, boards are more likely to fire underperforming CEOs 
who will be less able to become entrenched. Thus, the increase in CEO pay could be a 
                                                 
3 For example, a comprehensive index based on corporate governance provisions and state laws indicates 
no change in shareholders’ rights for the median or average firm among 1500 large corporations over the 
1990s (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003).   10
response to the decline in job stability faced by top managers as boards’ monitoring 
ability develops (Hermalin 2005). 
  Several pieces of evidence are consistent with this hypothesis.  The stability of top 
management positions has deteriorated, as indicated by the rising likelihood of forced 
turnover since the 1970s (Huson, Parrino, and Starks 2001) and the decline in CEO 
tenure since the mid-1990s (Kaplan and Minton 2006).   Moreover, boards’ ability to 
monitor CEOs has likely improved in recent years.
4  However, arguments similar to those 
made in Section 2.2.b highlight the difficulties of empirically evaluating this theory with 
available data. 
    
2.2.c Peer benchmarking 
Most corporations set CEO pay using as a benchmark the compensation at a peer group 
composed of similar companies.  The practice of competitive benchmarking is regarded 
as generating a ratchet effect that leads to continuous growth in the level of pay (Murphy 
1999).  To signal to the market that the incumbent CEO is of high-quality, firms award 
their chief executives a level of compensation above median pay in their relevant peer 
group.
5  If boards compensation in this manner, the median level of pay increases every 
year independent of the performance of the firm, leading to excessively high 
remuneration. 
  Arguably, the role of compensation consultants in the determination of CEO pay 
has increased since the 1970s (Khurana 2002).  However, this fact alone does not validate 
                                                 
4 For example, the presence of independent directors at boards has increased over time (Lehn, Patro, and 
Zhao 2003). 
5 A pay level below the 50
th percentile is often labeled “below market,” perhaps providing a negative signal 
to the market.   11
peer benchmarking as a major force in the growth of compensation.  Indeed, Bizjak, 
Lemmon and Naveen (2008) suggest that the practice of peer benchmarking may be an 
efficient way to determine the value of a CEO in a competitive market and retain 
managerial talent.  In particular, they find that peer-group benchmarking is more 
correlated to economic factors (measured by the labor market conditions and firm 
performance) than to the corporate governance of firms.    
   
2.2.d Social norms 
The growth in top management pay experienced in the U.S. since the 1970s happened 
concurrently with a pronounced increase in income inequality.  The disparity in pay was 
driven mostly by an expansion in income levels at the top of the distribution (Piketty and 
Saez 2003).  Thus, it is possible that the factors driving these two phenomena are related.  
I analyzed two of the main hypothesis for the change in income inequality (trade and 
skilled-biased technical change) and their relevance for executive pay in Section 2.1.  
However, a third main factor to be considered is changes in social norms.  According to 
this view, the rise in income inequality in the past three decades is a consequence of the 
removal of social norms that constrained the level of pay (Piketty and Saez 2003, Levy 
and Temin 2007).    
A limitation of this hypothesis is that social norms are not easily quantifiable, making 
it difficult to assess the importance of this explanation empirically.  Thus, the relevance 
of social norms for the trends in executive compensation is difficult to validate or 
disprove.  
   12
3.  Learning from the past: executive compensation as a longer-run concern 
In a cross-section of firms, it is possible to obtain evidence supporting many of the 
theories discussed in Section 2.  However, most of these arguments rely on measures that 
have changed monotonically over time since the 1970s.  Because executive pay was 
mostly trending upwards during this period, there is little evidence on a causal 
relationship between each of the relevant variables and the changes in compensation over 
time.  Thus, as argued in more detail by Frydman and Saks (2008), far less is known 
about the determinants for the time-series of executive pay.  
To better understand the mechanisms responsible for the level and structure of 
pay over time, a viable channel is to look for alternative sources of variation to evaluate 
the validity of each theory out of sample.  One plausible source is to focus on an earlier 
time period, when the changes in executive compensation were considerably different.  
This exercise is relevant because, as I argue in Section 3.1, the compensation of top 
executives has been a main problem for corporations ever since the separation of 
corporate ownership from corporate control during the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Berle and Means 1991).  Moreover, I show in the next section that analyzing executive 
pay during earlier decades is possible because systematic data on the remuneration of top 
managers is available since the mid-1930s. 
 
3.1 Earlier evidence on managerial pay   13
In the early 20
th century compensation practices were closely guarded secrets and 
consequently only scattered historical evidence exists on executive salaries.
6  Revelations 
regarding executive pay first occurred during World War I, when railroad corporations 
became managed by the federal government and the exorbitant salaries of railroad 
officers were exposed.  Public scrutiny intensified during the 1920s, when the 
compensation of railroad and banking executives were published in the popular press.
7   
By the early 1930s, the controversy surrounding the level of pay had extended to 
executives in all businesses. As the economy slipped into the Depression, the nation 
became increasingly troubled by the “lavish stipends and bonuses” accruing to the 
managers of large public corporations.
8  Prompted by these concerns, the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, the Federal Trade Commission, and several other institutions 
requested information on the compensation of officials in firms under their respective 
jurisdictions.
9  These dispersed efforts to monitor the compensation practices of major 
corporations were centralized with the establishment of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1934.   
Created to enforce the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC was put in 
charge of the disclosure of data by firms participating in the securities market, thereby 
regulating corporate finance (Seligman 2003).  Disclosure of information related to the 
                                                 
6 Court records are a possible source of information for this period, because they occasionally reveal the 
remuneration of corporate officers (Baker, 1938).  Alternatively, one could rely on payroll records from 
individual firms. 
7 See, for example, “Explains Big Salary of Railroad Head. Charles Frederick Carter Says Competent 
President Earns it Many Times,” New York Times, December 24, 1922; “Comptroller Seeks Salary Data 
From National Banks,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1921; “Commerce Commission Goes Into 
Executives’ Salaries,” Wall Street Journal, December 23, 1922; “They Earn Their Salaries,” Wall Street 
Journal, February 27, 1923.   
8 “Inquiry Into High Salaries Pressed by the Government,” New York Times, October 29, 1933.   
9 For example, the Federal Trade Commission was directed to collect information on the salaries of 
executives from the companies listed in the NYSE in 1933 (Senate Resolution No. 75, Seventy-third 
Congress).   14
remuneration of executive officers and directors was intended to deter managers from 
engaging in wrongful behavior and mismanaging corporate assets (Loss and Seligman 
1995).  Thus, the inception of the SEC has made executive compensation data through 
10-K reports and proxy statements available to the public from the 1930s to the present.   
These data have been used by researchers to analyze executive compensation at 
several points in time and, more recently, systematically by Frydman and Saks (2008), 
providing a consistent view of how compensation evolved over the longer run.  Thus, the 
theories proposed to explain evolution of pay over the past thirty should be contrasted 
against the now well-established facts on executive compensation over most of the 
twentieth century. 
 
3.2 A case study of executive compensation at General Electric 
To provide a more involved view of the changes in compensation policies and in the 
labor market for managers over time, I use the history of General Electric Corporation 
(GE) as an illustration.  This corporation is a primary example of corporate and 
technological success of the twentieth century.
10   
 
3.2.a Brief history of General Electric 
GE was constituted as a firm that operated in the electrification business in 1892 when 
Edison Electric Light Company, founded by Thomas Edison only two years earlier, 
merged with its competitor Thomas-Houston Electric Company.  Over time, and as many 
                                                 
10 For example, GE is the only firm of the original twelve companies that constituted the Dow Jones 
Industrial Index in 1896 still belonging to it.  Moreover, when Irving Langmuir won the Nobel Prize in 
Chemistry in 1932, he became the first individual to receive such award for research performed outside an 
academic institution.   15
other large successful firms in the economy, the business of GE evolved, mostly 
prompted by savvy managers that were able to anticipate future challenges.  The first 
stage of diversification came early in the twentieth century.  With the establishment of 
GE Labs, the pinnacle of scientific research within a corporation at that time, the 
company expanded into the manufacturing of transformers (1903), radio technology 
(1920s), and silicone and nuclear power (1940s).  The 1960s and 1970s were a period of 
diversification and GE was no exception, growing into sectors as diverse as aerospace, 
computers, and mining.  As may other firms becoming large conglomerates at that time, 
this fast growth came without significant improvements in stock market performance.  
Thus, the following two decades saw a refocus of the corporate strategy, with a switch 
from manufacturing to technology and (mainly financial) services as well as increasing 
the presence of the company abroad.  The company has changed its focus again in the 
past decade, by diminishing the reliance on financial services and mature industrial 
businesses, expanding instead into healthcare and entertainment. 
 
3.2.b Top management at General Electric and the market for managers 
Over the many challenges faced throughout its history, only nine chief executives led GE.   
These individuals had, in general, a fairly long tenure as chief executives; with the 
shortest tenure lasting five years while three CEOs remained at the position for at least 
twenty years.  GE’s managerial talent has always been groomed within the firm: 
excluding the early CEOs who joined the firm when it was founded, Jeff Immelt had the 
shortest tenure at the firm (a total of 18 years) among these nine individuals when he was 
appointed CEO in 2001.     16
The educational and career background of GE’s top managers is indicative of a 
broader trend in the market for executives.  Up to the late 1950s, almost all of GE’s 
CEOs had a college education and had specialized in either engineering or law.   
Depending on this background, they had mainly worked their way up either in production 
or in the legal department before moving into general management.  The education of 
chief executives became more varied since the 1960s, a fact that is also evidenced at GE: 
in the past four decades, these individuals had degrees in economics, engineering, or 
mathematics.  Moreover, Immelt is the first CEO at GE to hold an MBA degree, 
reflecting the growing importance of business education in the careers of top managers 
more generally.    
As revealed by the available biographical information, the work experience of top 
managers had also evolved considerably.  Prior to the 1970s, most top managers worked 
mainly in one sector of the firm (as production, finance, or the legal department) 
throughout their entire career.  Since then, a broader experience has become more 
important, perhaps because top managers are now required to lead corporations that are 
more diversified in nature.  As a consequence, many firms established programs to rotate 
promising managers across different sectors.  For example, Reginald H. Jones, GE’s CEO 
from 1972 to 1981, worked as a manager in consumer, utility, industrial, construction, 
and distribution fields after being assigned into general management, before becoming 
the chief financial officer of the corporation in 1968.  Thus, he plausibly acquired skills 
in several different areas of the firm that contributed to his success as a chief executive of 
a widely diversified corporation. 
   17
3.2.c Executive compensation at General Electric 
GE has been one of the best performers throughout the entire twentieth century, but the 
trends in the level and structure of compensation for its top executives are fairly 
representative of most large publicly traded corporations.
11  The remuneration of the 
three-highest paid officers at GE was entirely composed by salaries and current bonuses 
(bonuses in either cash or stock, both awarded and paid out in the given year) prior to the 
1950s. 
12  Perhaps prompted by extremely high labor income tax rates, forms of 
compensation more directly tied to the performance of the firm started being used at mid-
century.  Since the 1950s, deferred bonuses tied to firm and, on occasion, to individual 
performance gained importance.
13   Perhaps more surprising is that employee stock 
options became frequently used to remunerate “key employees” over this period (see 
Figure 1). 
As many other firms in the 1950s, GE established its first stock option plan in 
1953.  While high taxes on labor income reduced the attractiveness of cash 
compensation, options had a considerable tax advantage since the 1950s.  The 1950 
Revenue Act determined that, by satisfying a series of qualifications, “restricted” stock 
options could be taxed at the much lower rate on capital gains.  When introducing the 
new plan, GE’ management argued to their shareholders;  
Since […] the Internal Revenue Code amendment in 1950 [...] over 
200 companies whose stock is listed on the NYSE, including many 
                                                 
11 See Frydman and Saks (2008) for comparison to more representative trends based on a large sample of 
firms.  
12 Data on executive compensation was collected from GE’s proxy statements for several years. Because 
evidence for a single firm is intrinsically fairly noisy, the trends in pay are calculated using a three-year 
moving average for the compensation of GE’s three highest-paid officers.  
13 In the case of GE, these bonuses were mainly paid out after the executives had retired.  However, many 
other large firms established incentive compensation plans that awarded bonuses to be paid out in cash or in 
stock over a number of years (Frydman and Saks 2008).   18
competitors of your Company, have adopted stock option plans … 
[Such a plan] is essential if the Company is to compete successfully 
with other companies for the services of individuals of outstanding 
ability and accomplishment.  
General Electric’ Proxy Statement, March 20
th, 1953  
 
  GE’s proxy statement suggests that, by helping the firm to get around prohibitive 
taxation, stock options allowed the firm to compete for managerial talent, although they 
accounted for a small fraction of total pay at that time (see Figure 1).  More importantly, 
corporations were aware of its competitors’ compensation policies and, probably, of the 
level of remuneration awarded to other top executives even during this period.  Thus, the 
market for managers and, in particular, their compensation may have been more 
integrated during earlier decades than previously thought. 
The evolution of the total real level of pay for GE’s three highest-paid executives 
indicates that there were two distinct periods in remuneration policies.  First, the total real 
level of pay for GE’s top three managers increased at a slow rate of about two percent per 
year from the 1940s to the 1960s.  This period of little growth was followed by a rapid 
acceleration in top management pay, mostly encouraged by the increasing use of stock 
options since the 1980s and of restricted stock since the 1990s.  From the 1970s to the 
present, the compensation of the three highest-paid officers at GE has grown at the 
significantly higher annual rate of eight percent.  Executive compensation behaved in a 
different manner in the past, generating a different relationship between executive 
compensation and several of the proposed determinants for the recent increase in pay   19
over the earlier decades.  Thus, historical evidence presents a challenge to some of the 
main explanations discussed in Section 2.   
 
3.2.d Generalizing the findings  
Focusing on a particular company allows revealing both general trends as well as 
emphasizing that the experiences of particular firms and managers are, to a large extent, 
idiosyncratic.  However, it is important to relate the evidence for GE to more general, 
stylized facts on compensation and managerial careers that have been put forth by the 
existing literature.  Moreover, new long-run facts can be used to illuminate the current 
debate on the drivers of executive pay.   
A main contribution of analyzing executive pay during earlier periods is that the 
long-run trends provide significant variation in the level of compensation over time.   
Most of the debate on managerial pay has focused on finding theories that can explain a 
steady and rapid increase in CEO compensation.  However, the evidence from GE 
discussed here and, for a more comprehensive set of firms, in Frydman and Saks (2008), 
shows a significantly different pattern during earlier decades.  Following World War II, 
executive pay remained fairly constant for almost three decades.  This is surprising 
relative to current evidence because the governance of corporations was arguably weaker, 
the ownership of firms was more dispersed than in recent years, and firms were also 
growing and becoming more complex during this earlier period.  Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence from GE and other corporations suggests that firms were aware of and took the 
compensation strategies of competitors into account when determining the pay of their   20
top managers, at least since the disclosure of pay data started being required by the SEC 
in the 1930s.  
It is difficult to argue that the competition in product markets did not increase as 
well during the 1950s and 1960s, a period of little change in executive compensation.  
However, trade and globalization may have affected firms at the end of this period in a 
more direct manner, by affecting the tasks that executives were responsible for and, 
consequently, the market for managers more broadly.
14  The history of GE is indicative of 
an important transformation in the market for top managers.  Once large corporations 
were relatively mature by the 1950s and 1960s, the market for top managerial talent took 
place mostly within the organization.  These “organization men” rose through the ranks 
of the firm, most often than not working their way up in one particular area of the firm 
(usually in production or in the legal department) (Whyte 1956).   Managerial skills seem 
to have been mostly firm-specific; top executives usually had an educational background 
in science or engineering, were exposed to a single area of the firm before becoming 
general managers, spent most of their career at the same corporation, and rarely moved to 
a different firm late in their career (even when passed up for the chief executive position).   
The slow but steady growth in the importance of business education and the 
increasing diverse sectoral experience of managers indicate that managerial skills have 
are become more general in nature since mid-century.  Moreover, as discussed in Section 
2.1.b, the likelihood of selecting an outsider for the CEO position has more than doubled 
                                                 
14 Anecdotal evidence suggests that a shift in the demand for managerial skills occurred as firms evolved 
during the 1950s and 1960s due to globalization, competition, and increases in the complexity of large 
corporations.  For example, Packard (1962) emphasizes that “Both the competition and the new markets 
that European unity promises—plus the need of U.S. companies to expand significantly to develop world 
markets—call for new imaginative kinds of business leadership. […] There is grave doubt that America 
industry has been developing enough of the kind of leaders who will be competent to guide their enterprises 
effectively in this new environment.”   21
in the past three decades.  However, many firms (as GE, for example) still maintain a 
policy of forming and recruiting its own top managerial talent within the organization.  
But even in those firms, the behavior of the market for managers indicates that the 
mobility of executives across industries and organizations has increased.  When GE 
selected Jeff Immelt in 2001 for the CEO position, W. James Mc Nerney Jr. and Robert 
L. Nardelli, the two contenders from the firm that were passed up for the job, quickly left 
to become CEOs in firms as different from GE as 3M and Home Depot, respectively.  
The responsibilities of top executives appear to have evolved over time, arguably from 
tasks requiring mostly firm-specific skills to decisions based on general human capital 
that could be applied in diverse firms.  However, the pace and magnitude of these 
changes suggest a relatively minor role of a shift in the types of managerial skills on the 
long-run evolution in compensation (Gabaix and Landier 2008, Kaplan and Rauh 2007).  
In sum, earlier data provides a new environment in which to contrast the main 
theories for the recent rise in CEO pay.
 15  Available evidence suggests that the proposed 
explanations do not fit well with the long-run trends, raising new challenges to provide an 
understanding of the evolution of executive compensation and the labor market for 
corporate managers. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
In this article, I argue that the lack of consensus on the determinants for the recent 
increase in CEO and other top management pay is in part associated with the use of 
quantitative evidence that is limited to the past three decades.  Because the changes in 
                                                 
15 Two remaining theories, the importance of social norms and outside opportunities for managers, are hard 
to assess empirically because it difficult to construct relevant proxies.      22
compensation have been fairly monotonic over this period, an understanding of the time-
series evolution of pay has been limited.   
  An alternative strategy to better grasp the mechanisms that affect executive 
compensation is to learn from the past by assessing the main proposed theories using data 
for other countries or other time periods.  In particular, the disclosure of compensation for 
publicly traded corporations allows this exercise for U.S. firms since the 1930s.  These 
historical data reveal a complex picture of the evolution of managerial pay and the market 
for managers.  Moreover, most of the common explanations for the recent changes in 
compensation cannot individually account for its evolution over the long run.  To match 
the trends suggested by the quantitative and anecdotal evidence for the twentieth century, 
future research should evaluate new views of the determinants of pay as well as address 
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Notes: Compensation is measured as the three-year moving-average for each measure of pay for 
the three highest-paid executives as reported in General Electric’s proxy statements.  Salary and 
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year.  Long-Term (L-T) Bonus measures the amount paid out in the year from long-term bonuses 
awarded in prior years.  Stock Option Grants is defined as the Black-Scholes value of stock 
options granted in the given year.  The real level of pay is calculated in millions of $2000, using 
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